Abstract-In an outsourced database framework, clients place data management responsibilities with specialized service providers. Of essential concern in such frameworks is data privacy. Potential clients are reluctant to outsource sensitive data to a foreign party without strong privacy assurances beyond policy "fine prints." In this paper, we introduce a mechanism for executing general binary JOIN operations (for predicates that satisfy certain properties) in an outsourced relational database framework with computational privacy and low overhead-the first, to the best of our knowledge. We illustrate via a set of relevant instances of JOIN predicates, including: range and equality (e.g., for geographical data), Hamming distance (e.g., for DNA matching), and semantics (i.e., in healthcare scenarios-mapping antibiotics to bacteria). We experimentally evaluate the main overhead components and show they are reasonable. The initial client computation overhead for 100,000 data items is around 5 minutes and our privacy mechanisms can sustain theoretical throughputs of several million predicate evaluations per second, even for an unoptimized OpenSSL-based implementation.
INTRODUCTION
O UTSOURCING the "database as a service" [25] emerged as an affordable data management model for parties ("data owners") with limited abilities to host and support large inhouse data centers of potentially significant resource footprint. In this model, a client outsources its data management to a database service provider which provides online access mechanisms for querying and managing the hosted data sets.
Because most of the data management and query execution load is incurred by the service provider and not by the client, this is intuitively advantageous and significantly more affordable for parties with less experience, resources, or trained manpower. Compared with, e.g., a small company, with likely a minimal data management knowledge, such a database service provider intuitively has the advantage of expertize and the ability to offer the service much cheaper, with increased service availability and uptime guarantees.
Significant security issues are associated with such "outsourced database" frameworks, including communication-layer security and data confidentiality. Confidentiality alone can be achieved by encrypting the outsourced content. Once encrypted however, the data cannot be easily processed by the server. This limits the applicability of outsourcing, as the type of processing primitives available will be reduced dramatically.
Thus, it is important to provide mechanisms for serverside data processing that allow both confidentiality and a sufficient level of query expressibility. This is particularly relevant in relational settings. Recently, protocols for equijoin and range queries have been proposed [15] , [34] , [35] .
Here, we go one step further and provide low overhead solutions for general binary JOIN predicates that satisfy certain properties: for any value in the considered data domain, the number of corresponding "matching" pair values (for which the predicate holds) is upper bound. We call these finite match predicates (FMPs).
Such predicates are extremely common and useful, including any discrete data scenarios, such as ranges, inventory and company asset data sets, forensics and DNA data (e.g., fuzzy and exact Hamming distances), and healthcare databases (e.g., bacteria to antibiotics matches). Moreover, at the expense of additional client-side processing (pruning of false positives) other predicate types (multiargument, continuous data) can be accommodated.
While on somewhat orthogonal dimensions, it might be worth noting that other important challenges are to be considered in the framework of database outsourcing. Transport layer security is important as eavesdropping of data access primitives is unacceptable. This can be achieved by deploying existing traditional network security protocols such as IPSec/SSL. Moreover, query correctness issues such as authentication and completeness are important and have been previously considered [41] , [35] , [42] , [45] .
The main contributions of this paper include:
1. the proposal and definition of the problem of private joins for generalized query predicates, 2. a solution for FMPs, 3. its analysis, 4. a proof-of-concept implementation, and 5. the experimental evaluation thereof. The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 introduces the main system, data and adversary models. Section 3 overviews, details, and analyzes our solution. Section 4 proposes predicate instance examples and their handling. Section 5 introduces our proof-of-concept implementation and provides its experimental analysis. Section 6 surveys related work and Section 7 concludes.
MODEL
We choose to keep the data outsourcing model concise yet representative. Sensitive data are placed by a client on a database server situated at the site and under the control of a database service provider. Later, the client can access the outsourced data through an online query interface exposed by the server. Network layer confidentiality is assured by mechanisms such as SSL/IPSec. This corresponds to a unified client model [14] , [35] . Clients would like to allow the server to process data queries while maintaining data confidentiality. For this purpose, they will encrypt data before outsourcing. As encrypted data are hard to process without revealing them, to allow for more expressive server-side data processing, clients will also preprocess data according to a set of supported (join) predicates. They will then outsource additional associated metadata to aid the server in processing tasks. This metadata, however, will still be "locked" until such processing tasks are requested by the client.
Later, to allow server-side data processing, the client will provide certain "unlocking" information for the metadata associated with the accessed items. The server will perform exactly the considered query (and nothing more) without finding out any additional information.
It is important for the outsourced metadata not to reveal any information about the original data. Additionally, the computation, storage, and network transfer overhead should maintain the cost advantages of outsourcing, e.g., execution times should not increase significantly. We consider a relational model, where we consider the outsourced data as a set of t data columns (e.g., relational attributes), D stored on the server. Let n be the average number of values stored in a column and b be the number of bits in the representation of a value. Naturally, we allow relations to contain a variable number of tuples. We use this notation for analysis purposes only.
Finite match predicates. In this paper, we consider binary predicates p : X X Â Y Y ! IB ¼ ftrue; falseg\for which the "match sets" P ðxÞ :¼ fyjpðx; yÞ ¼ trueg can be computed by a polynomial time algorithm and their size (taken over all encountered values of x) is upper bound. In other words, given a certain value x in the considered data domain, its "matching" values can be determined in polynomial time and their number is upper bound. We call these predicates finite match predicates. For a relation R matched against a relation S, we define MMS, the maximum match size, to be the maximum number of matching values from relation R for any row in relation S. For instance, consider the following discrete time-range join query that joins arrivals with departures within the same 30 mins interval (e.g., in a train station):
SELECT Ã FROM arrivals; departures WHERE ABS ðarrivals:time À departures:timeÞ < 30.
In this example, the FMP has an MMS of 60.
Privacy requirements. In the considered adversarial model, the following privacy requirements are of concern.
Initial confidentiality. The server should not be able to evaluate intercolumn join predicates on initially stored data without client "unlock" permission. Formally, given a relation A with encoded elements D½a 1 ; . . . ; D½a n , a relation B with encoded elements D½b 1 ; . . . ; D½b m , any random values i 2 f1 . . . ng and j 2 f1 . . . mg, for any probabilistic polynomial time server algorithm S, the value jP r½SðD½a i ; D½b j Þ À 1=2j is negligible.
Predicate safety. Following a client join request, the server can only evaluate the stored data for the predicate provided by the client. Specifically, given a relation A with encoded elements D½a 1 ; . . . ; D½a n , a relation B with encoded elements D½b 1 ; . . . ; D½b m , and a predicate pred for which the client provides opening information openðpredÞ, the server can only learn the value predða i ; b j Þ 2 ftrue; falseg, 8i ¼ 1 . . . n and j ¼ 1 . . . m. Formally, given a predicate pred and corresponding openðpredÞ revealed by the client, for any other predicate pred 0 6 ¼ pred for which the server does not have openðpred 0 Þ and any random values i 2 f1 . . . ng and j 2 f1 . . . mg, for any probabilistic polynomial time server algorithm S, the value jP r½S pred 0 6 ¼pred ðopenðpredÞ; D½a i ; D½b j Þ À 1=2j is negligible.
We stress that here we do not provide confidentiality of predicates, but rather just of the underlying target data. We also note that we do not consider here the ability of the server to use out-of-band information and general knowledge about the data sets to infer what the underlying data and the query results look like. In fact, we envision a more formal definition in which privacy guarantees do not allow any leaks to the server beyond exactly such inferences that the curious server may do on its own based on outside information.
Performance constraints. The main performance constraint we are interested in is maintaining the applicability of outsourcing. In particular, if a considered query load is more efficient (than client processing) in the unsecured data outsourcing model, then it should still be more efficient in the secured version. We believe this constraint is essential, as it is important to identify solutions that validate in real life. There exist a large number of apparently more elegant cryptographic primitives that could be deployed that would fail this constraint. In particular, experimental results [43] indicate that predicate evaluations on the server should not involve any expensive (large modulus) modular arithmetic such as exponentiation or multiplication. We resisted the (largely impractical) trend (found in existing research) to use homomorphisms in server side operations, which would have simplified the mechanisms in theory but would have failed in practice due to extremely poor performance, beyond usability. In fact, in Section 5, we show that solutions that would employ homomorphisms would be several (2-4) orders of magnitude slower than solutions that we propose in this paper.
We assume that server storage is cheap. This assumption is supported by recent findings that show the total cost of storage management is orders of magnitude higher than the storage equipment acquisition costs [18] .
Adversary. We consider an honest but curious server: given the possibility to get away undetected, it will attempt to compromise data confidentiality (e.g., in the process of query execution). The protocols in this paper are protecting mainly data confidentiality. The server can certainly choose to deny service by explicitly not cooperating with its clients, e.g., by not returning results or simply closing connections.
Tools

Encryption, Hashing and Random Numbers
We consider ideal, collision-free hashes, denoted by H. We consider semantically secure (IND-CPA) encryption mechanisms. We denote by E K ðvÞ the encryption of value v with secret key K. If not specified, the key K will be implicitly secret and known only to the client. In the following, we use the notation x ,! R S to denote x's uniformly random choice from S.
Bloom Filters
Bloom filters [8] offer a compact representation of a set of data items, allowing for fast set inclusion tests. Bloom filters are one way, in that, the "contained" set items cannot be enumerated easily (unless they are drawn from a finite, small space). Succinctly, a Bloom filter can be viewed as a string of l bits, initially all set to 0. To insert a certain element x, the filter sets to 1 For an excellent survey on applications on Bloom filters and their applications in a variety of network problems, please see [10] .
Computational Intractability Assumptions
Let G G be a finite field of size p prime and order q and let g be a generator for G G. The Computational Diffie-Hellman assumption (CDH) [22] : Definition 1. Given g, g a mod p, and g b mod p, for a; b 2 Z Z q , it is computationally intractable to compute the value g ab mod p.
In the same cyclic group G G, the Discrete Logarithm assumption (DL) states that Definition 2. Given g; v 2 G G, it is intractable to find r 2 Z Z q such that v ¼ g r mod p.
OUTSOURCED JOINS WITH PRIVACY
We define the arbitrary (nonhard coded to a specific application) predicate join solution to be a quadruple ðpred F M ; G; E; JÞ, where pred F M is the FMP, G is a parameter generation function, E is a data preprocessing function, and J denotes a joining function according to predicate pred F M . G and E are executed by the client and the output of E is outsourced to the server. J is executed by the server on two attributes of the client's data. In this section, we provide a general description of the G, E, and J functions and in Section 4 we study two predicate and corresponding G, E, and J function instances. In Table 1 , we summarize the symbols used in our solution.
G is a parameter generation operation executed initially by the client. Its input is N, a security parameter and t, the number of columns in the client database D. Let p ¼ 2p 0 þ 1 be a N bit long prime, such that p 0 is also prime. The reason for this choice is to make the CDH assumption harder. Let G G ¼ Z Z p be a group of order q, with a generator g. 
We now describe the join operation, J, executed by the server. J takes as input two column names A; B, a desired predicate pred F M and a trapdoor value (computed and sent by the client) r AB ¼ g y A =xB mod p and outputs the result of the join of A and B on pred F M .
JðA; B; pred F M ; r AB Þ. For each element b j 2 B, compute e A ðb j Þ ¼ r OðbjÞ AB mod p. That is, e A ðb j Þ denotes the value b j encoded in the same fashion as the elements encoded in BF ða i Þ. For each element a i 2 A, iff BF ða i Þ:containsðe A ðb j ÞÞ return the tuple hE K ða i Þ; E K ðb j Þi.
In real life, J will output also any additional attributes specified in the SELECT clause, but for simplicity we make explicit here and in the following only the join attributes.
Analysis
We now prove the following results:
Theorem 1 (Correctness). The join algorithm J returns all matching tuples.
Proof. During the join function J, for each element b j 2 B, the server computes the value e A ðb j Þ ¼ r Proof. We need to prove that given a relation A with encoded elements D½a 1 ; . . . ; D½a n , a relation B with encoded elements D½b 1 ; . . . ; D½b m , along with client provided opening information r AB ¼ g y A =xB mod p and any random values i 2 f1 . . . ng and j 2 f1 . . . mg, for any probabilistic polynomial time server algorithm S, the value jP r½S pred 0 6 ¼pred ðr AB ; D½a i ; D½b j Þ À 1=2j is negligible. Let the element
As mentioned in the proof of Theorem 1, no advantage can come from the encrypted values E K ða i Þ and E K ðb j Þ. Moreover, the opening information r AB does not provide information concerning BF ðb j Þ; thus, in the following we ignore this Bloom filter.
Similar to the proof of Theorem 1, we make the simplifying assumption that the structure BF ða i Þ ¼ fg HðvÞy A j8v 2 P ða i Þg, where is a random permutation. That is, BF ða i Þ stores the encoded matching elements for a i in a random order, instead of further encoding them in a Bloom filter. Then, any advantage of algorithm S can be either from 1) Oða i Þ, Oðb j Þ, and r AB or from 2) Oðb j Þ, r AB , and BF ða i Þ. In case 1, S can obtain values g HðbjÞy A and g HðaiÞ x A . However, these values cannot be compared without defeating the discrete logarithm assumption. In case 2, S can determine if the value r Oðb j Þ AB is in BF ða i Þ. However, further comparisons of r Oðb j Þ AB with the other elements in BF ða i Þ cannot occur due to the use of cryptographic hash functions: the outputs values of the hashes of even similar values a i and b j will likely differ in half of their bits. t u
Discussion and Extensions
Notes on transitivity. Under certain circumstances, the server may use our solution to perform transitive joins. That is, provided with information to join A with B and later to join B with C, it can join A and C. We make the observation that on certain FMPs any solution will allow the server to perform partial transitive joins, using the outcome of previous joins. That is, when an element b 2 B has matched an element a 2 A and an element c 2 C, the server can infer that with a certain probability a also matches c. In conclusion, we believe the transitive join problem to be less stringent than reducing server-side storage and computation overhead. Same-column duplicate leaks. In the case of duplicate values occurring in the same data column, a data distribution leak can be identified. The deterministic nature of the obfuscation step in the definition of E associates the same obfuscated values to duplicates of a value. Upon encountering two entries with the same obfuscated value, the server indeed can infer that the two entries are identical. We first note that if joins are performed on primary keys this leak does not occur. Additionally, it is likely that in many applications this is not of concern. Nevertheless, a solution can be provided, particularly suited for the case when the number of expected duplicates can be upper bound by a small value (e.g., m). The deterministic nature of Oða i Þ is required to enable future Bloom filter lookups in the process of predicate evaluation. However, as long as the predicate evaluation is designed with awareness of this, each duplicate can be replaced by a unique value. This can be achieved by 1) populating Bloom filters with multiple different "variants" for each value expected to occur multiple times, and 2) replacing each duplicate instance with one of these variants instead of the actual value. These variants can be constructed, for example, by padding each value with different log 2 ðmÞ bits. For example, if the 10-bit value 513 (binary 1000000001) is expected to occur multiple times (but no more than m ¼ 4), 2 bits will be prefixed to its binary representation, to yield its four "variants": 001000000001, 011000000001, 101000000001, 111000000001. For each occurrence, one of these variants will be used instead in computing its obfuscated value in E's definition. Additionally, in any Bloom filter, instead of inserting just v ¼ 513 (e.g., BF ða i Þ:insertðg HðvÞy A Þ), all its four variants will be inserted. Care needs to be taken for larger m values, as this solution can lead to space blowups or increases in the rate of false positives due to the additional "variant" information inserted in the Bloom filters.
Bloom filter sizes. Bloom filters (see Section 2.1.2) feature a controllable, arbitrarily small rate of false positives for set inclusion tests. In the case of a join, the false positive rate of Bloom filters implies that a small percentage of the resulting joined tuples do not match the predicate the join has been executed for. These tuples will then be pruned by the client. Their percentage is then determined by the equations from Section 2.1.2. Thus, a tradeoff between storage overhead and rate of false positives (and associated additional network traffic) emerges. Larger Bloom filters reduce this rate but require more storage, whereas smaller ones are cheaper to store but will incur additional network traffic and client-size pruning of nonmatching results. Moreover, associated network traffic costs are heavily dependent on the sizes of values in the data tuples. The optimal sizes for Bloom filters become thus an application specific decision. For example, for a predicate MMS ¼ N ¼ 60 (e.g., in the simple query in Section 2), a desired false positive rate of no more than p fp ¼ 0:8%, the equations from Section 2.1.2 can be used to determine one optimal setup l ¼ 600 and h ¼ 7.
Data updates and multiple clients. In data outsourcing scenarios, it is important to handle data updates incrementally, with minimal overhead. In particular, any update should not require the client to reparse the outsourced data sets in their entirety. The solution handles data updates naturally. For any new incoming data item, the client's preprocessing function E can be executed per item and its results simply forwarded to the server. Additionally, in the case of a multithreaded server, multiple clients (sharing secrets and keys) can access the same data store simultaneously.
Complex, multipredicate queries. Multiple predicate evaluations can be accommodated naturally. Confidentiality can be provided for the attributes involved in binary FMPs. For example, in the following database schema, the association between patients and diseases is confidential but any other information is public and can be used in joins. To return a list of Manhattan-located patient names and their antibiotics (but not their disease), the server will access both confidential (disease) and nonconfidential (name, zip-code) values SELECT patients.name,antibiotics.name FROM patients,antibiotics WHERE md (patients.disease,antibiotics.name) AND patients.zipcode=10128. Only the predicate mdðÞ will utilize the private evaluation support. This will be achieved as discussed above, by encrypting the patients:disease attribute and generating metadata for the antibiotics relation (which contains a list of diseases that each antibiotic is recommended for).
PREDICATE INSTANCES
To illustrate, we choose to detail two predicate instances: a simple, range join and a Hamming distance predicate requiring custom predicate-specific extensions.
Range JOIN
Consider the binary FMP pðx; yÞ :¼ ðv 1 ðx À yÞ v 2 Þ where x; y 2 Z Z. An instance of this predicate is the following travel agency query, allocating buses to trips, ensuring 5 (but no more than 10) last-minute empty slots per trip:
SELECT buses.name,trips.name FROM buses,trips WHERE (buses.capacity-trips.participants)>=5 AND (buses.capacity-trips.participants)<=10.
Executing such a query remotely with privacy can be achieved efficiently by deploying the solution presented in Section 3. The parameter generation algorithm, G and the join algorithm J will be the same. As above, the data encoding algorithm encodes in the Bloom filter BF ða i Þ of element a i all integer values in P ða i Þ :¼ fyjpða i ; yÞ ¼ trueg namely with values 2 ½x À v 2 ; x À v 1 . Note that given the size of the range,
Hamming JOIN
It is often important to be able to evaluate Hamming distance on remote data with privacy in untrusted environments. This has applications in forensics, criminal investigation (e.g., fingerprints), biological DNA sequence matching, etc.
Let A private execution of this join operation can be deployed using the solution introduced in Section 3. The implementation of the Hamming part of the predicate requires specific adjustments. In particular, in preprocessing, the client pseudorandomly bit-wise permutes all the data elements consistently. It then splits each data element into equal-sized blocks, where is an input parameter discussed later. Then, for each such block, it generates three data items: one item will allow later private comparisons with other blocks for equality (Hamming distance 0). The other two (a Bloom filter and a "locked" obfuscated value) will be used by the server to identify (with privacy) blocks at Hamming distance 1. In the following, we describe the ðd H ; G H ; E H ; J H Þ solution, as an extension of the solution presented in Section 3.
The parameter generator, G H , takes two additional parameters, and b. b is the bit length of elements from D and is the number of blocks into which each data element is split. We assume > d is constant, much smaller than the number of elements stored in a database column. Possible values for are investigated later in this section.
G H (N,t, operation 
Otherwise, move to the next element, a iþ1 , from A. If at the end of the k loop, c < d, return hE K ða i Þ; E K ðb j Þi. Else, move to the next element from A, a iþ1 .
Note that for future query purposes the client does not need to remember the values (x A ðkÞ, y A ðkÞ, z A ðkÞ) for each column A. Instead, it generates them by seeding its PRG with s A . For this, the client only needs to store one value, s.
Analysis
We now prove the following result for the Hamming join solution proposed above.
Theorem 4. Any given pair of elements from A and B at
Hamming distance less than or equal to d is found with probability at least e Àd= ð1 þ dÀ1 Þ. Proof. The operation of splitting the permuted elements into blocks and then comparing the Hamming distance between blocks can be viewed as a balls and bins process, where blocks represent bins and bit-wise differences represent balls. That is, bit-wise differences between any two elements a i and b j are thrown uniformly at random into blocks. If d H ða i ; b j Þ d, for two elements a i and b j , then using the balls and bins paradigm, the probability of a pair of blocks ða ik ; b jk Þ, k ¼ 1 . . . , having Hamming distance exactly l is
The probability of blocks ða ik ; b jk Þ to have Hamming distance smaller than or equal to 1 is then
Þ.
We now have to prove that if any pair of blocks from two values a i and b j has at most one bit-wise difference, algorithm J H indeed returns the pair a i ; b j . To see why this is the case, consider that As an example, for a value ¼ 800 and d ¼ 100, the probability of finding a matching pair is 99.39 percent. Besides using a larger , this probability can be further increased by trading off data storage and privacy. For instance, the server could store for each block a ik of a data element a i a Bloom filter containing all possible blocks at Hamming distance 2, a Bloom filter for all possible blocks at Hamming distance 3 and so on, until the desired precision level is reached.
Note on predicate safety. The reasoning used in Theorem 2 can be easily used to show that the (d H ,G H ,E H ,J H ) solution satisfies the confidentiality requirement. The predicate safety requirement, however, remains only partially true. The server can in fact determine the actual Hamming distance between matching (but encrypted) ða i ; b j Þ pairs (satisfying the d H ða i ; b j Þ < d condition). Moreover, the server can also find the Hamming distance of some encrypted ða i ; b j Þ pairs for which d < d H ða i ; b j Þ . While out of scope here, a solution can be provided for this case by prefixing original a i , b j values with a random number of special symbols with controllable Hamming distances.
Complexity Analysis
Let T encr be the time to encrypt an element, T exp the time to perform one modular (p) exponentiation, T mul the time to perform a modular (q) multiplication, and T hash the time to perform a crypto-hash operation. h is the number of hash functions used to encode elements in a Bloom filter. Then, if t is the number of attributes in the relation, the following results hold.
Proof. The per-element initial overhead is the sum of three factors: 1) the cost to encrypt the element, 2) the cost to generate the obfuscated O and Z values, and 3) the cost to generate the Bloom filters, each storing b= elements. The cost of storing one element in a Bloom filter is equal to the cost of generating the obfuscated element (a crypto-hash application and an XOR) plus the cost of another h crypto-hashes for generating the bit-wise positions to be set to 1. t u
Lemma 2. The server-side storage overhead is OðtnNÞ, where N is the bit size of p. The computation overhead for a Hamming join operation over two columns of n elements is OðnðT exp þ hT hash ÞÞ.
Proof. The original database has OðtnÞ elements. Since a Bloom filter encoding s numbers takes OðsÞ bits (see Section 2) and the number of values y that are at Hamming distance 1 from a bit string of length b= is b=, the storage required by the Bloom filters of an element is OðbÞ. The first result follows then from the observation that each of the blocks of an element, stored as output of the O and Z functions, requires Oðb=Þ bits. The second result is due to the fact that the Hamming join computation overhead consists of Bloom filter searches for all the blocks for each of n 2 pairs of elements from the two joined columns.
t u See Section 5 for a discussion on why for practical purposes a single crypto-hash application may be enough to replace the h Bloom filter hashes.
Extensions
Arbitrary alphabets. The above solution can also be deployed for an arbitrary alphabet, that is, when the elements stored in the database D are composed of symbols from multibit alphabets (e.g., DNA sequences). This can be done by deploying a custom binary coding step. Let A ¼ f 0 ; . . . ; uÀ1 g be an alphabet of u symbols. In the preprocessing phase, the client represents each symbol over u bits (u= log u-fold blowup in storage), such that symbol u ¼ 2 i . That is, d H ð i ; j Þ is 1 if i 6 ¼ j and 0 otherwise. If each data item has b symbols, each of the item's blocks will have bu= bits, and, due to the coding, pairs of elements of symbolwise distance d will have a 2d bit-wise Hamming distance. Thus, after the coding phase, the above algorithm can be deployed without change. As an example, for an alphabet of four symbols {A,C,G,T}, the following encoding will be used fA ¼ 0001; C ¼ 0010; G ¼ 0100; T ¼ 1000g. To compare the strings ACG and ACT (alphabet distance 2), the following two binary strings will be compared instead: 000100100100 and 000100101000 (binary Hamming distance 2).
Arbitrary distances. One drawback of the previous solution is the fixed nature of the Hamming distance d that can be considered. To accommodate a different distance, additional metadata would need to be generated by the client accordingly. Instead, it would be desirable to provide a single solution for any distances. In the following, we show how to extend the above solution for arbitrary distances.
For this purpose, the encoding algorithm E H is modified to perform a hierarchical generalization of the previous shuffle-and-divide preprocessing step. The new algorithm, E F H calls E H log b times, for ¼ f1; 2; 2 2 ; . . . ; bg. As a result, each data element has log b layers of metadata, one for each value of (the individual block size). Fig. 1 illustrates the output of function E F H for two layers.
The extended join algorithm, J F H , is initially executed by the client and takes as an input parameter the distance d of interest. Based on d and the desired miss rate, J F H decides upon the appropriate layer of metadata on which the join should be performed and calls J H , to be executed on the server, with the corresponding parameters, detailed earlier.
For instance, if the join is done on the metadata for the layer corresponding to the value e ¼ 2 dlog deþ1 , then the miss rate can be upper bound by 8 percent. The following result is then straightforward.
Theorem 5 (Overheads).
The server-side storage overhead for supporting arbitrary distance Hamming joins increases by a factor of log b over the Hamming join overhead. The computation and traffic overhead remain the same.
Note that the server-side storage overhead for supporting arbitrary distance Hamming joins increases by a factor of log b over the Hamming join overhead. The computation and traffic overhead remain the same.
Variable data sizes. For illustration purposes, the algorithms above have been presented considering elements of the same, known size. We now show how to deploy them also for data columns with values of different representation bit sizes.
In the preprocessing stage, given an alphabet A ¼ f 0 , 1 ; . . . ; uÀ1 g, the client introduces an additional symbol, Ã . It then represents each of the u þ 1 alphabet symbols on u þ 1 bits, with i ¼ 2 i and Ã ¼ 2 u . Let l be the expected maximum symbol length of elements stored in the database and l A l the symbol length of elements in column A. The client then reduces this problem to the previous setting by "padding" each column with Ã symbols up to length l. For example, it appends ðl À l A Þ symbols of type Ã to each element in A. The padding is done before the random bit-wise permutation of the elements, to prevent the server from differentiating the padding symbols.
Hamming distance predicates will then be rewritten accordingly. For example, to find all pairs of elements from columns A and B whose Hamming distance is less than or equal to d, the client searches for all pairs at distance d þ jl A À l B j. This method has an additional padding-related storage overhead that depends on the distribution of the data column symbol lengths. It functions best if this distribution is very narrow. For flatter distributions, other nonpadding mechanisms could be envisioned.
Additional Examples
We illustrated above two predicate instance extremes: one very simple and straightforward range predicate and a more complex Hamming distance scenario, requiring custom, predicate-specific mechanisms. In the following, we list just a few more (and some of their application domains), straightforward to deploy using the solution above.
pðx; yÞ :¼ ðfðx; yÞ R rÞ. Financial, geographic location queries. For example, fðx; yÞ ¼ x 2 þ y 2 and R ¼ '< '. pðx; yÞ :¼ ð x y 2 Z; x; y 2 ZÞ. pðx; yÞ :¼ ðx y e mod qÞ. Cryptography. pðx; yÞ :¼ (antibiotic x matches bacteria y). Health care diagnostics.
pðx; yÞ :¼ (patient x has disease y). Census, health care.
EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
Implementation details. We conducted our experiments using a C++ implementation of the private predicate join algorithms, on 3.2 GHz Intel Pentium 4 processors with 1 GB of RAM running Linux. We implemented the cryptographic primitives using OpenSSL 0.9.7a. Our goal was to investigate the feasibility of the algorithms in terms of computation, communication and storage overhead, both on the client and the server side.
To understand the costs of encryption and hashing, we have evaluated several symmetric encryption and cryptohashing algorithms. In our setup, we benchmarked RC4 at just bellow 80 MB/sec, and MD5 at up to 150 MB/sec, shown in Fig. 2 . We also benchmarked integer hashing throughput at more than 1.1 million MD5 hashes per second, showing the "startup" cost of hashing.
As recommended by the Wassenaar Arrangement [32] , we set N, the size of the prime p to be 512 bits and the size of the prime q to be 160 bits. From our benchmarks, shown in Fig. 3, we have concluded that 512-bit modular exponentiations (with 160 bit exponents) take 274 usec while 512-bit modular multiplications take only 687 nsec.
We have considered three types of applications for the private join algorithms. In a first application, we used single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs) from a human DNA database [2] . An SNP is a variation of a DNA sequence that differs from the original sequence in a single position. The goal of a join is to identify all pairs of sequences from two columns, that differ in a single position. To achieve this, the Bloom filter of a DNA sequence contains all the sequence's SNPs. For each value from the data set from [2], there are 25 SNPs, whose values are drawn from the four nucleotides, A, C, G, and T. Thus, each Bloom filter stores 100 values (MMS ¼ 100). Note that we have simplified the SNP evaluation for the purposes of illustration, as each SNP is actually composed of two nucleotides (one from the father and one from the mother). This effectively doubles the number of bits needed to represent them. Our second application performs fingerprint matching, that is, identifying similar pairs of fingerprints. We have used fingerprint data from [1] where each fingerprint consists of 100 features. For this application, we considered only fingerprints that differ in at most one feature to be a match; thus, Bloom filters store 100 values (MMS ¼ 100). The last application identifies picture similarities, using digital images from the LabelMe [41] and Caltech 101 [17] databases. A set of images is annotated with scores for lightness, hue, or colors of interest [16] , [20] . The Bloom filter associated with an image contains score ranges of interest, which for this application was set to 100 values around the image's score (MMS ¼ 100). To compare two images for similarity, the score of one image is searched in the Bloom filter associated with the other image.
Client computation overheads. We now describe our investigation of the initial client preprocessing step. Of interest were first the computation overhead involved in generating the encryption, obfuscation, and Bloom filter components associated with a database of 100,000 elements of 16 bytes each. We experimented with four combinations of encryption algorithms (RC4 and AES) and hashing algorithms (MD5 and SHA1), in a scenario where Bloom filters store 100 items each. Fig. 4 depicts our results (log scale time axis). For each encryption/hash algorithm combination shown on the x axis, the left-hand bar is the encryption cost, the middle bar is the Bloom filter generation cost, and the right-hand bar is the obfuscation cost. Our experiments show the dominance of the Bloom filter generation, a factor of 30 over the combined encryption and obfuscation costs. The total computation cost of each implementation is roughly 320 seconds with the minimum being achieved by RC4/MD5. We further investigated the RC4/MD5 combination by increasing the MMS value from 10 to 100. Fig. 5 shows that the preprocessing overhead increase is linear in the MMS value. The total costs range between 40 seconds (MMS ¼ 10) and 7 minutes (MMS ¼ 100). We stress that this cost is incurred by the client only once, during the computation of the initial data structures.
Server computation costs. In order to evaluate the performance of the private join algorithm, we used columns of 10,000 images each, collected from the LabelMe [40] and Caltech 101 [17] databases. For each image, we deployed 1,024-bit Bloom filters (h ¼ 12 hashes) with MMS ¼ 100. The join operation returns all pairs of images that have scores within a given range of each other. In our implementation, for each element from one column, we perform a 512-bit modular exponentiation with a 160 bit modulus, followed by a crypto-hash, fragment the result into 12 parts, and use each part as a bit position into each of the Bloom filters associated with the elements of the other column.
As, to the best of our knowledge, no other solutions exist for arbitrary private joins on encrypted data, we chose to compare our solution against a hypothetical scenario which would use the homomorphic properties of certain encryption schemes such as Paillier [38] . This comparison is motivated by recent related work (e.g., [19] ) that deploy this approach to answer SUM and AVG aggregation queries on encrypted data. Moreover, we also considered the cost of solutions that would use RSA encryptions or decryptions to perform private joins. Finally, we have also compared our solution against a base case with no privacy (NP): the server stores the data in cleartext, performs joins on request from the client, and returns the exact results. [19] ) is the fact that while the modulus n has 1,024 bits, the multiplications are actually performed in the space Z Z Ã n 2 . That is, the active modulus has 2,048 bits. Using less than 1,024 bits for n is not recommended [3] , [32] . Note that as expected our solution is two orders of magnitude (21.3 s) less efficient than the trivial solution (0.23 s) that stores the data in cleartext at the server.
Storage overhead. Since we use symmetric encryption algorithms, the size of the E values stored on the server is roughly the same as the original size of the elements-thus, no significant overhead over storing the cleartext data. The size of the O value for each element is N ¼ 512 bits, which is small and data independent. Finally, Fig. 7 shows the overhead of the 1,024 bit Bloom filters as a percentage of the size of the original data. The largest overhead is 42 percent, for the SNP database, due to the smaller size of SNPs. However, for image databases, the overhead is under 3 percent and for fingerprints is under 1 percent. Note that the total space storage overhead for 100,000 items is 18.31 MB.
Transfer overhead. We have measured the communication overhead of the initial database transfer between sites located in Chicago and New York, more than a thousand miles apart. With the bottleneck being the uplink capacity of the client, of around 3 Mbps, the overhead of transferring the Bloom filters associated with 100,000 items was roughly 32 seconds.
Summary. The experimental evaluation of the main overhead show that they are reasonable. The small initial costs of generating metadata and transferring the database are only incurred once. The storage overhead of the metadata is small and independent of the size of the data items. Finally, the cost of executing 100 million private FMPs is 2-4 orders of magnitude faster than that of implementations using the homomorphic properties of certain asymmetric encryption algorithms to provide privacy.
Hamming join versus generic solution. To understand the advantages of the Hamming Join solution when compared with the generic solution, we consider our fingerprint matching problem. Each fingerprint has 100 features (b ¼ 100) and we are interested in matching fingerprints that have up to four different features (d ¼ 4). In the Hamming Join solution, we consider a value of ¼ 16, that is, we divide the 100 bit feature strings into 16 blocks, of 7 bits each. Let the total space allocated for the Bloom filter associated with a fingerprint be 1,024 bits. Then, for each of the 16 blocks of bits of a fingerprint, the associated Bloom filter has 64 bits. Each Bloom filter has to store seven values, leading to a false positive rate per block Bloom filter fp % 0:62 64=7 ¼ 0:012. The overall false positive rate (probability of returning a pair with distance larger than 4) is upper bounded by the false positive rate in any of the 16 À Á ¼ 4;087;975 elements. To achieve the same false positive rate as the one achieved by the Hamming Join solution, the generic solution's Bloom filters have to have 13,596,925 bits. Thus, the storage overhead of the generic solution is more than 13,000 times larger than the one of the Hamming Join approach. Fig. 8 shows for the same problem, the completeness of the result of the Hamming join (the probability of returning a matching pair) as a function of the value of . Note that for ¼ 16, this probability exceeds 0.975.
RELATED WORK
The paradigm of providing a database as a service recently emerged [25] as a viable alternative, likely due in no small part to the dramatically increasing availability of fast, cheap networks. Given the global, networked, unreliable, possibly hostile nature of the operation environments, providing security and integrity assurances has become essential. Extensive research has focused on various aspects of DBMS security and privacy, including access control and general information security issues [5] , [4] , [6] , [7] , [12] , [13] , [26] , [27] , [29] , [30] , [33] , [36] , [37] , [39] , [41] . Statistical and Hippocratic databases aim to address the problem of allowing aggregate queries on confidential data (stored on trusted servers) without leaks [4] , [5] , [12] , [13] , [31] .
Hacigumus et al. [24] introduced a method for executing SQL queries over partly obfuscated outsourced data. The data are divided into secret partitions and queries over the original data can be rewritten in terms of the resulting partition identifiers; the server can then partly perform queries directly. The information leaked to the server is claimed to be 1-out-of-s where s is the partition size. This balances a tradeoff between client-side and server-side processing, as a function of the data segment size. At one extreme, privacy is completely compromised (small segment sizes) but client processing is minimal. At the other extreme, a high level of privacy can be attained at the expense of the client processing the queries in their entirety. We believe this client load requirement to defeat the very purpose of data outsourcing.
Similarly, Hore et al. [28] deployed data partitioning to build "almost"-private indexes on attributes considered sensitive. An untrusted server is then able to execute "obfuscated range queries with minimal information leakage." An associated privacy-utility tradeoff for the index is discussed.
Ge and Zdonik [19] have proposed the use of a secure modern homomorphic encryption scheme, to perform private SUM and AVG aggregate queries on encrypted data. Since a simple solution of encrypting only one value in an encryption block is highly inefficient, the authors propose a solution for manipulating multiple data values in large encryption blocks. Such manipulation handles complex and realistic scenarios such as predicates in queries, compression of data, overflows, and more complex numeric data types (float). In Section 5, we show that the overhead of the operations used in [19] is very large, exceeding the overhead of FMP predicate joins by three orders of magnitude.
The problem of searching on encrypted data has also been studied extensively. The setting of this problem consists of clients that need to store encrypted documents on an untrusted server and later wish to privately retrieve the documents containing certain encrypted keywords, without revealing to the server the keywords of interest. Song et al. [44] introduced an elegant solution that uses only simple cryptographic primitives. Chang and Mitzenmacher [11] proposed a solution where the server stores an obfuscated keyword index which is then used by the client to perform the actual searches. Golle et al. [23] provide a solution with the additional feature of allowing conjunctive keyword searches. In a similar context, Boneh et al. [9] proposed the notion of "public key encryption with keyword search." They devised two solutions, one using bilinear maps and one using trapdoor permutations. While ensuring keyword secrecy, these techniques do not prevent servers from building statistics over searched keywords.
Goh [21] proposed the notion of a "secure index," which is a data structure associated with a file. The secure index is stored on a remote server and allows clients to privately query an item into the file. The operation can be performed only if the clients have knowledge of a particular trapdoor value. The construction of a secure index uses pseudorandom functions and Bloom filters. Since this solution requires knowledge of the trapdoor associated with the searched item, secure indexes are not flexible enough to be used for private joins on outsourced data.
Yang et al. [45] study the complementary problem of authenticating the results of joins in outsourced databases, where the server needs to construct a proof of correctness, which can be verified by the client using the data owners signature. The work introduces three join algorithms and demonstrates experimentally that they outperform two benchmark algorithms, by several orders of magnitude, on all performance metrics. We note that this work complements our solutions: we provide the privacy of the outsourced data and of the returned results, while the work of Yang et al. [45] provides proofs of correctness and completeness of the results.
Summary. Previous related work focuses on the problem of performing private search, range and aggregate queries on encrypted data. In this paper, we address a different problem, of privately performing join operations on encrypted attributes, using arbitrary FMP predicates. While previous work cannot be used to solve this problem, increased outsourced database functionality can be provided when our solutions are used in conjunction with existing results.
CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we introduced mechanisms for executing JOIN operations on outsourced relational data with full computational privacy and low overheads. The solution is not hardcoded for specific JOIN predicates (e.g., equijoin) but rather works for a large set of predicates satisfying certain properties. We evaluated its main overhead components experimentally and showed that we can perform more over 5 million private FMPs per second, which is between two and four orders of magnitude faster than alternatives that would use asymmetric encryption algorithms with homomorphic properties to achieve privacy.
